Check Point’s email researchers flagged more than 302,386 unique phishing emails built around fake calendar invites in customer mail, sent to more than 40,000 organizations, in a wave that began rising on 25 September 2026 1. The campaigns average more than 8,319 messages per active day, from more than 33,890 sender domains and more than 247,270 sender addresses 1. A block list built domain by domain lags a sender pool that size.
Sublime Security measured the same trend on its own customers and put August 2026 at 1,216 percent over July, with the first half of September above the whole of August 2. Two vendors counted different mail streams and landed on the same curve, which is my reason for treating the volume as a standing condition.
I cannot do anything about the volume at the gateway. What I can do is clean up after it, and cleanup is where this campaign splits into two problems.
Two shapes of the lure
Check Point describes two deliveries. One attaches an .ics file to the message. The other puts the invitation in the message body, and their published example is a fake Teams invitation whose Join link resolves to a credential page rather than to Teams 1.
The .ics shape is the one I spend the most time explaining. The file is valid calendar data, and Check Point’s wording for why that matters is the plainest I have found: the attack “abuses calendar features and user trust without exploiting a software vulnerability” 1.
Nothing in that attachment is malformed. Content inspection reads a well formed iCalendar body and has no rule to match, since the file is neither a broken document nor an executable stub.
The message and the appointment are two objects
A meeting invitation that lands in a mailbox leaves two objects behind. Outlook creates the calendar entry during delivery, and Microsoft’s account of the gap says those entries can remain active even after the email is deleted 3.
Mark Morris, a detection engineer at Sublime Security, explains why a mailbox removal does not settle it:
Because email and calendar operate over different protocols, there is a non-zero chance that even if the target’s email security solution catches [and quarantines] the phishing email, the meeting would still land on the target’s calendar 4.
He also makes the counting argument: invitations go to both the calendar and the inbox, so a campaign gets two chances at the same user 4. The protocol difference is the part I point at. Mail is filtered at the gateway. The calendar object syncs through the client and the calendar service, on a path the mail gateway does not inspect.
Which action reaches the calendar
Microsoft’s remediation documentation defines five mailbox actions. Four of them name a folder: junk, inbox, deleted items, the recoverable items folder 5. The hard delete definition carries a clause the other four do not, and it purges the message “and the corresponding calendar entry for meeting invite messages” 5.
That clause arrived with a change Microsoft announced in November 2025, when hard delete began removing the associated calendar entry for any meeting invite email, from Explorer, advanced hunting and the API 3. The same announcement carries two notes that decide how I read a cleanup. Resending the invitation restores a deleted calendar entry. And the action does not remove calendar entries that users added themselves from .ics files 3.
Read those notes next to this campaign. The attachment is the shape Check Point names first, and the remediation clause covers the invitation that arrives as a message. An .ics needs the user to open it and add the event before a calendar entry exists at all, and once it exists, the entry is user-created and the hard delete on the message does not reach it. The strongest action in the set covers one of the two shapes, and the campaign runs on both.
What I check before I call one closed
Delivery has already happened by the time a phish reaches me, and what I get is a day-old message. I check four things and write them down, because the next person to look at the same report will ask which of them was done.
- The first thing I pull is the action that ran. If it moved the message to junk, to deleted items, or into the recoverable items folder, the definition covers a mailbox folder and nothing more, and the calendar entry was outside its scope 5.
- Next I look for the event itself. Mail search will not return it, so I search the calendar by the subject line and by the organizer address in the invitation, since both fields travel with the event.
- The third item is the link inside the event, and whether anyone clicked it. A URL in a calendar entry is still a URL, and it now sits on a surface the user treats as their own schedule.
- The last check is whether the campaign is still sending. A resend restores an entry that was deleted, so yesterday’s cleanup is not a finished state 3.
For an attached .ics I add one more: whether the user added the event. When they have, the entry comes out of the calendar in its own step, after the message has already been purged, and the two steps are not the same job.
What I put in front of leadership
The number I relay is two counts, messages removed and calendar entries removed. Those come apart whenever the message was an .ics attachment, and my write-ups name the message count first, so the calendar count is the one I have to add by hand.
My campaign write-up states which of the five actions ran, and it says that hard delete is the only one whose definition names the calendar entry 5. The recommendation that follows is short: hard delete the invite messages, then check the calendars, since the .ics copies did not come along with the purge.
For users I skip the warning about links. An appointment they did not accept can sit on their calendar with a link inside it, and that link goes where the sender wanted them to go, from a place they trust more than an inbox.
The message and the appointment are two objects in two stores. I count them apart, clean them apart, and check the calendar myself, because the action that is easiest to reach is the one that leaves the event in place.
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Check Point Software Technologies. (2026, October). Fake calendar invites target thousands of organizations in Microsoft credential-phishing campaign. Check Point Blog. https://blog.checkpoint.com/securing-user-and-access/fake-calendar-invites-target-thousands-of-organizations-in-microsoft-credential-phishing-campaign/ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
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Morris, M. (2026, September 17). Sublime observes massive uptick in ICS phishing and calendar-based malware attacks. Sublime Security. https://sublime.security/blog/sublime-observes-massive-uptick-in-ics-phishing-and-calendar-based-malware-attacks/ ↩︎
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Microsoft. (2025, November 24). Strengthening calendar security through enhanced remediation. Microsoft Community Hub. https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/microsoftthreatprotectionblog/strengthening-calendar-security-through-enhanced-remediation/4456876 ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
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Zorz, Z. (2026, October 20). Quarantined, but still on your calendar: The explosion of invite-based attacks. Help Net Security. https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/10/20/malicious-calendar-invites/ ↩︎ ↩︎
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Microsoft. (2025, September 16). Remediate malicious email delivered in Office 365. Microsoft Learn. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/remediate-malicious-email-delivered-office-365 ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎