FreeSWITCH handles SIP MESSAGE as chat. The handler splits the To user on a plus sign and reads the left half as a chat protocol name, then dispatches the message to whichever registered chat interface matches 1. One of those interfaces is called api, and mod_dptools registers it with its address going straight to switch_api_execute() 1. Address a message to a user named api+<something> and the something is the command the daemon runs.

The advisory rates it 9.8 with no privileges required, and states that exploitation of the path has been observed in the wild 1. NVD published the record on 5 November from the GitHub CNA 2. FreeSWITCH is not a system I run, so this is not a patch on my list. I read it twice for the design mistake in it. The receiver takes a text message, the message chooses which command executes, and the arrangement ships turned on.

One table for delivery and execution

The split matters because of the table it feeds. Chat interfaces exist to deliver text. The api interface exists to execute a command. Both register in the same table, and the dispatch carries nothing that marks one as a delivery path and the other as an execution path. The advisory says message-delivery protos are not distinguished from command-execution protos 1.

A field designed to say “deliver this to the chat handler” can say “run this” instead, and the receiver honors both without checking which it got. mod_lua loaded, as the stock configuration loads it, gives the same message a second route to command execution through inline Lua with the full standard library 1.

The default is what sets the score

Chat handling is on unless a profile sets enable-chat=false, and the stock conf/vanilla leaves it on for both the internal and the external profile 1. The inbound ACL does not cover MESSAGE, so tightening the ACL does not take a profile out of scope 1. The prerequisite is one MESSAGE that a profile accepts.

On a profile that enforces MESSAGE authentication, any one account is enough: an extension, a handset, or a trunk peer holding no permission beyond the ability to register 1. The stock directory file conf/vanilla/directory/default/default.xml also defines a user with neither a password nor an a1-hash, and that user authenticates unless it is set to allow-empty-password=false 1. A stock install with a profile facing the internet therefore carries a path that needs no account at all, and that sentence goes in the first line of my relay note.

What the partial fixes leave open

The advisory lists three workarounds and says what each one fails to do. MESSAGE authentication is on by default from 1.10.7 onward 1, so a profile that never touched the setting already enforces it, and the path still runs for any account holder. disable_system_api_commands=true removes the system API and leaves the route in place, so the route still reaches every other registered API, including module loading and call origination 1. enable-chat=false on profiles that do not need SIP chat is the one that stops the message before the protocol selector is parsed.

The fix in 1.11.3 adds a per-profile enable-chat-api-proto parameter that stays off unless someone sets it, so the route closes by default for everyone who upgrades 1. A MESSAGE that selects the protocol where it is not enabled gets a 403 and a log line carrying the source and the requested command 1. The tag went out on 28 August, and its release notes list “Bound the To-user split in the inbound MESSAGE handler” next to the new parameter 3. A patched build sat available for two months before anyone reading the advisory knew why the upgrade mattered.

What I ask of any inbound listener

Three questions, in this order. Does the listener accept the message before it authenticates the sender? What can the message content reach, a lookup or an executor? Is the switch that enables the feature written down anywhere I can read?

The third question is the one I see missed. A parameter that defaults to on and appears in no configuration file is a decision the vendor made and the operator inherited, and the gap between those two is what an answer of “we do not use that feature” papers over. I read the default before I record a feature as off, because the config file is the only place that answer is written down.

What this changes in my relay

CVE-2026-116779 is not on the KEV catalog. The 6 November catalog holds 1,769 entries and lists no FreeSWITCH product 4, so no CISA due date arrives with this one and the ranking is mine to write. I put a finding at the top when it needs no credential, reaches code execution, sits on a shipped default, and carries an exploitation report. This one meets all four. Absence from KEV describes CISA’s catalog; the advisory carries its own exploitation statement 1, and that statement is why I rank this above items that carry a due date but need credentials first.

For the teams that own the systems, the recommendation is 1.11.3 or later, enable-chat=false on every profile that does not need SIP chat, and no directory user without password material. Deployment stays with them and the order comes from me, which is the usual split.

The switch has a name now and it defaults to closed. The ones that still default to open are the ones I want on a list before an advisory names them.


  1. SignalWire. (2026, October 28). Inbound SIP MESSAGE can select the api chat proto and run FreeSWITCH API commands (GHSA-mg63-h38w-8p9p). GitHub Security Advisories. https://github.com/signalwire/freeswitch/security/advisories/GHSA-mg63-h38w-8p9p ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

  2. National Vulnerability Database. (2026, November 5). CVE-2026-116779 detail. National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116779 ↩︎

  3. SignalWire. (2026, August 28). FreeSWITCH v1.11.3 release. GitHub. https://github.com/signalwire/freeswitch/releases/tag/v1.11.3 ↩︎

  4. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2026, November 6). Known exploited vulnerabilities catalog (version 2026.11.06). https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog ↩︎