Cisco published the advisory for CVE-2026-76418 on 28 October 1. The flaw sits in the remote access SSL VPN service on Cisco Secure Firewall ASA and FTD. An unauthenticated attacker sends a crafted request at the VPN login and the device reloads. Cisco rates it 8.6, and the vector puts all of the impact on availability 1. NVD carries the weakness as CWE-690, an unchecked return value 2. CISA added the CVE to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 29 October with a remediation due date of 1 November 2.
My queue puts an 8.6 availability bug behind the 9.x remote issues. This one went to the front of my list because the path in is the login endpoint of the appliance that terminates remote access, and the condition that opens that path is a line of configuration. My first question is whether any tunnel group on an internet-facing box uses secondary authentication. The release comes after that.
Affected is a build question, exposed is a config question
Cisco states three conditions for a device to be affected: a vulnerable release, the SSL remote access VPN login service reachable, and secondary authentication configured in the tunnel group scope 1. A build number answers the first. The running configuration answers whether the other two exist.
The checks I ask for, in the advisory’s terms:
show running-config webvpn, looking forwebvpnwithenable <interface>on at least one interface 1show running-config tunnel-group, looking forsecondary-authentication-server-group1- on FTD, the deployed remote access VPN policy and the running configuration it produces, since a policy that someone edited in the manager but never deployed does not count 1
The tunnel group command settles the answer. Cisco says the check covers every tunnel group, including the default DefaultWEBVPNGroup, and that it is not limited to the profiles the login page displays 1.
Disabling the group list leaves the default group in scope
Plenty of configurations turn tunnel-group-list enable off to keep the login page tidy. Cisco covers that case: with the list absent or removed, an operator still has to check the default group, because disabling the list does not remove exposure when DefaultWEBVPNGroup uses secondary authentication 1. A fleet report that says “group list disabled” and stops has not answered the question.
The advisory also records that a successful VPN login is not required to reach the affected processing path 1. That changes what a failed-login count means on these appliances. I read a run of failed VPN authentications as stale credentials or a password spray. The attacker reaches the vulnerable code before authentication finishes. The second factor sits after the step that fails, which means MFA in front of the VPN does not gate this bug.
The relay, in order
The relay I send to the people who own the appliances runs in this order:
- Every ASA and FTD that terminates remote access VPN, with the interface names where the SSL VPN answers.
- Of those, every box with secondary authentication on any tunnel group, default group included.
- Of those, the boxes whose login service answers from the internet.
- The build, checked against the fixed release for its own train.
Only the fourth item needs the advisory’s fixed-release table, and that table is per train. The ASA fixes are 9.16.4.104, 9.18.4.96, 9.20.4.50, 9.22.3.200, 9.23.1.48, 9.24.1.27 and 9.24.10.1, with FTD running from 7.0.11 for 7.0 and earlier up to 10.1.1 for 10.1 1. That gives six ASA trains and seven FTD trains, each train carrying its own number, with the 9.24 train carrying two. A spreadsheet column holding one current version per appliance will mislead somebody unless it also holds the train.
The offered mitigation is a risk decision
Cisco states that no workaround addresses the vulnerability, then describes a mitigation in two cases 1. If the default group carries no secondary authentication, an operator can disable the tunnel group list. Users then have to know their connection profile name instead of picking it from a list. If the default group uses secondary authentication, the mitigation removes the secondary auth server group, which Cisco says lowers the security posture for remote access VPN 1. Cisco tested the mitigation and reports that it worked in that test environment, while telling customers to evaluate it in their own before deploying it 1.
Removing a second factor to avoid an outage is a decision for whoever accepts the account risk on that VPN. I hand it over as an option with the trade attached. The patch is the fix, and Cisco publishes one for every affected train 1.
The cost of a reload
A reload takes the appliance out of service while it boots, and every tunnel on it drops. On a device that filters other traffic as well, the outage reaches past the VPN. The attacker needs no credential and no session to reach the path.
I cannot price that outage for a site I do not run, and I do not try. I can only make sure the inventory is right before somebody sets the maintenance window, since the window decides how many people notice the reload.
The part that outlasts the deadline
The KEV entry set 1 November as the due date and directed agencies to apply vendor mitigations under BOD 26-04 2. That deadline has passed. A fixed build closes the bug on the boxes that receive it, and the tunnel group inventory is what tells me which boxes had the path at all. That inventory goes stale when somebody adds a connection profile, so it belongs in the change review alongside the change that creates it.
Cisco credits the finding to Eric Fernald during a TAC support case 1. A support case is a fitting place for this bug to surface. The config that triggers it is something an operator sets once and rarely revisits, which is also why the check needs a written inventory rather than a memory.
-
Cisco Systems. (2026, October 28). Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance and Secure Firewall Threat Defense Software remote access SSL VPN tunnel denial of service vulnerability (Advisory cisco-sa-asaftd-tunnel-dos-s6mgkb75). Cisco Security Advisories. https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-tunnel-dos-s6mgkb75 ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
-
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2026, October 30). CVE-2026-76418 detail. National Vulnerability Database. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76418 ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎