CISA added four vulnerabilities to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 18 November, based on evidence of active exploitation 1. Three carry a remediation deadline of 21 November, three days after the listing; LiteLLM’s falls on 2 December 2. All four are below. The Apache Axis item is the one I would move first because there is no fixed release to install.

Apache Axis 1.x has no patch to wait for

Axis 1 parses an inbound SOAP Fault while the engine works out which service the message is for. When the fault carries a <detail><exceptionName> element, the engine loads the class named there; with a String <data> element alongside it, Axis instantiates that class through its String constructor. Both steps run before the code checks whether the result is an AxisFault. Loading the class alone runs its static initializer, so a suitable class on the application classpath gives an attacker code execution 3.

Two details make this worse than the usual deserialization bug. The parse happens before any per-service handler chain runs, so an authentication handler configured on that service never gets to reject the message 3. And Apache has closed the line. Axis 1 is end of life, the project does not plan a 1.x release for this, and the guidance is to move to Axis 2 or build from the commit that fixes it. The flaw covers every 1.x version through 1.4. Apache’s own container rates it critical without a numeric score 4; the 9.8 comes from CISA’s ADP entry on the same record 3.

Finding it is the hard part, because nobody installs a SOAP engine on purpose any more. It arrives inside something else: an old integration, a vendor management interface, a jar in a build nobody has touched since the last acquisition. I would search the build files for axis:axis and then ask the application owners what still answers on those paths. My part is the inventory and the deadline. The teams that run those endpoints decide whether the thing gets retired, fronted by something that drops malformed faults, or rebuilt from the patched commit.

REDCap asks for a survey hash instead of a login

CVE-2026-90817 is an unauthenticated remote code execution in REDCap’s survey passthrough routing and Data Import handling. An attacker manipulates HTTP requests to reach a controller route from a public survey context, then supplies a crafted file-path or stream parameter during import processing. The one precondition is knowledge of a valid public survey hash 5.

The precondition is weaker than it sounds. Public survey links exist to be shared, so the hash is not a secret in any practical sense. The flaw covers REDCap 13.3.0 and higher. Securifera, the CNA that published the record, scores it 9.8, and NVD carries that score 5. The record’s solution line names 16.0.49 LTS, 17.3.10 LTS and 17.4.4 as the fixed releases 6. Research groups run this software for longitudinal studies and consent workflows, which means a survey endpoint can sit on a server that also holds participant data. The version check is the first move. Whoever administers an instance can read the build from the admin interface and compare it against those three numbers.

Synology fixed this one before CISA listed it

CVE-2024-10441 is the oldest of the four. CISA listed it on 18 November with a deadline of 21 November 2, and the deep dive carries the vulnerability and the version detail: CVE-2024-10441, the 9.8 in Synology DiskStation Manager.

LiteLLM’s sandbox check does not hold

CVE-2026-40217 is a code injection in BerriAI LiteLLM through 2026-04-08 7. A logged-in user sends crafted Python to /guardrails/test_custom_code. The endpoint screens that code with regular expressions 8, and bytecode rewriting gets around the screen, so the code executes on the AI proxy 7.

The score is 8.8 rather than 9.8 because the attacker needs an account, and that requirement is the only thing holding it back. A proxy sits between applications and model providers and holds the credentials for that path, so code execution on it exposes the keys and the traffic through it. Red Hat ships the affected code in Ansible Automation Platform 2.6, OpenShift AI 3.3 and Lightspeed Core, which reaches past the people who installed LiteLLM themselves 9. The deadline here is 2 December 2. I would use the extra days to find every instance instead of deferring the update, because a container deployed once from a compose file does not announce that a newer version exists.

If an Axis 1 endpoint exists in your environment and nobody can name its owner, that endpoint is the one I would go and look at first.


  1. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2026, November 18). CISA adds four known exploited vulnerabilities to catalog. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/11/18/cisa-adds-four-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog ↩︎

  2. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2026, November 18). Known exploited vulnerabilities catalog (catalog version 2026.11.18). https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

  3. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2026, November 6). CVE-2026-90436 detail. National Vulnerability Database. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90436 ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

  4. MITRE. (2026, November 6). CVE-2026-90436 record. CVE Program. https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-90436 ↩︎

  5. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2026, September 20). CVE-2026-90817 detail. National Vulnerability Database. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90817 ↩︎ ↩︎

  6. MITRE. (2026, September 20). CVE-2026-90817 record. CVE Program. https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-90817 ↩︎

  7. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2026, April 10). CVE-2026-40217 detail. National Vulnerability Database. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40217 ↩︎ ↩︎

  8. X41 D-Sec. (2026, April 8). X41-2026-001: Guardrail sandbox escape in LiteLLM. https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2026-001-litellm/ ↩︎

  9. Red Hat. (2026, April 10). CVE-2026-40217. Red Hat Security. https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-40217 ↩︎