On 5 November 2026, mail to outlook.com, hotmail.com, live.com and msn.com addresses started bouncing with a single sentence: 550 5.7.1 Message rejected: Message lacks SPF/DKIM/DMARC Auth Records 12. The sentence reads like a diagnosis of three failures, and it offers one label for whichever of them is missing. I read the headers of my own copy before I open a DNS zone. That order separates a justified record change from a guess.

The bounce names three records and distinguishes none of them

A bounce that listed the results would carry more information. Microsoft’s earlier bounce for high-volume senders, 550 5.7.515, lists the SPF, DKIM and DMARC results for the message 1. This one only says records are missing, which fits one missing record as well as three 1.

Two details in the rollout complicate that reading. The AS9031519 suffix showed up on the second day, and the first day’s bounces carried the same text without it, so a search for the code misses 5 November 2. Microsoft’s notice names a second code, 550 5.7.23, whose text starts with “Sender Policy Framework violation” and ends in the same 5.7.1 sentence, which is why GlockApps describes senders reading that first line as an SPF failure 13. The notice also expands SPF as “Service Provider Foundation” rather than Sender Policy Framework, so it does not report that SPF failed 2.

The result code has a registered meaning

The receiving side records what it checked in an Authentication-Results field. RFC 9989, the DMARC specification published in May 2026 that replaced RFC 7489, registers the dmarc result codes: pass means a policy record exists for the author domain and an authenticated identifier aligned with it exists, and none means no policy record exists for that domain 4.

Those two codes cannot describe the same domain at the same moment. EasyDMARC reported that some senders saw Microsoft’s headers record dmarc=pass for domains that publish no DMARC record 2. A header and a bounce that disagree like that are describing two different things, and neither description is the DNS state I was about to change.

On a refused message I often have no receiver header at all. The refusal happens inside the SMTP session, so the delivery status notification carries the sentence and a server name and nothing about which check ran. I still have my own copy of the message: the From domain, the d= value in the DKIM-Signature, and the envelope sender. If the signature domain and the envelope sender are both the From domain, the bounce is describing the From domain’s own record, and that record is the next thing to read. If either one differs, that other domain is where a missing record would live, and I check it first.

The order I check

  1. The domain the receiver evaluated. DMARC applies to the From domain and alignment is measured against it, so a bounce that names no domain has not told me what to check 4.
  2. The policy record for that domain. RFC 9989 walks from a subdomain to its organizational domain when the subdomain publishes nothing, so an empty answer at _dmarc. for the exact subdomain does not end the check 4.
  3. The domain in the DKIM signature. A platform that signs with its own domain produces a DKIM pass that does not align, and Microsoft 365 signing with the onmicrosoft.com domain until DKIM for the custom domain is enabled is the common way to arrive there 2.
  4. Whether anything failed. Without that item, the record change is a guess with a propagation delay attached to it.

A record at p=none is presence, not policy

Senders who added the record reported delivery resuming once it was live 2. GlockApps ran eight seed tests across 24 mailboxes on 7 and 8 November and found that every DMARC configuration they tried stopped the refusal, including p=none published on the parent domain only 3. Publishing the record did not move the folder: one test domain landed in spam under every configuration and the other reached the inbox 3.

RFC 9989 says a discovered policy of p=none MUST NOT modify existing mail handling processes 4. A record with no policy behind it cannot be why the receiver accepted the message. It satisfied a check that looked for presence. I write that into my change note in those words, because “added a DMARC record to satisfy a receiver’s presence check” is something the next reader can act on, while “fixed our DMARC” invites that reader to skip the reports.

What the incident notice settles

Microsoft closed incident EX1545193 on 10 November at 05:36 UTC. The notice describes a recent update to its spam enforcement rules, which marked and blocked mail to outlook.com, hotmail and live addresses in error from 18:00 UTC on 6 November to 11:02 UTC on 9 November, and Microsoft rolled the update back in full 2. The notice does not mention DMARC 2, and no requirement was added for small senders; Microsoft’s published rule for senders of 5,000 or more messages a day stays in place 1.

Community reports began on 5 November, a day before the window in the notice 2. A 550 is a permanent refusal, so a sending server has no reason to retry it, and anything that bounced during those days needs to be sent again 1. The recipient never learns that a message existed.

One of these will land in my queue again, from some other receiver with its own string. I will keep the AS code as a search string, read Authentication-Results on any copy that carries one, and check the From domain, the signature domain and the record before I touch a zone file.


  1. Johnson, T. A. (2026, November 6). Outlook.com rejected mail from domains without DMARC. MailRoute. https://mailroute.net/blog/outlook-rejecting-email-without-dmarc ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

  2. Khatchoian, H. (2026, November 9). Microsoft briefly rejected mail from domains without DMARC: here’s what we know. EasyDMARC. https://easydmarc.com/blog/microsoft-rejecting-emails-without-dmarc/ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

  3. GlockApps. (2026). Outlook rejects email without DMARC: fix the bounce, then test placement. GlockApps. https://glockapps.com/blog/outlook-rejects-email-without-dmarc/ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

  4. Herr, T. M., & Levine, J. (Eds.). (2026, May). Domain-based message authentication, reporting, and conformance (DMARC) (RFC 9989). Internet Engineering Task Force. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9989 ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎